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TRIAL-COURT DISCRETION: ITS EXERCISE BY TRIAL
COURTS AND ITS REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURTS
Joseph T. Sneed*
I.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The pervasiveness of this topic is illustrated by Appendix
A,' a survey of volumes 658 and 659 of the Federal Reporter,
Second Series. Statistical data at the conclusion of Appendix A
indicate that approximately one-fourth of the total number of
cases reported contained one or more issues in which trial-court
discretion was subjected to scrutiny by appellate courts. As a
result of this scrutiny, approximately seventy percent of the trial
courts' actions were approved and approximately thirty percent
were disapproved. These data correspond to other similar
surveys undertaken.
Considerable discretion on the part of district and appellate
courts is provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which include approximately fifty
provisions that either explicitly or implicitly recognize the
existence of discretion.

*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1973-2008. Judge Sneed
used this outline when speaking at a Federal Judicial Center workshop for the district
judges of the Second Circuit on May 8, 1982. The outline has been edited where
appropriate to convert its seminar-podium shorthand to prose. The editors are grateful to
the Archives of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the repository of
Judge Sneed's papers, for making it available to the Journal and for authorizing this first
print appearance of Judge Sneed's thoughtful consideration of trial-court discretion.
1. Appendices A and B appear on pages 209-29, infra. Judge Sneed pointed out that
Appendices A and B are "not a complete list," that "[n]o such list [is] possible," and that
there is "nothing scientific about either" appendix. The editors caution the reader in
addition that neither of the appendices has been updated; some authorities cited in them
have doubtless been superseded.
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Thus, the topic of trial-court discretion is very wide. But
the question remains: "Is it very deep?" My answer is equivocal:
Good sense tells me that it ought to be. Surely a topic as
pervasive as the exercise of judicial discretion is not an area
about which it can -be said that there is "no law at all" worth
talking about. Nonetheless, it is true that judicial opinions
almost invariably discuss the exercise of discretion by a court in
a particular area as a discrete topic unrelated to other situations
in which judicial discretion is recognized and exercised. Thus,
while it is difficult to assert that general law pertaining to the
exercise of judicial discretion exists, it is true that a great deal of
particular law exists. Nonetheless, my purpose is to suggest that
perhaps some useful generalizations are possible.
II. THE MEANING OF DISCRETION
To have discretion is to have choice. To have choice is to

be able to choose one course of action over one or more others
with immunity from reversal by a higher court because of the
course selected. The range of choice is determined by the
number of permissible courses of action that exist. This number
may be as small as two or innumerable. The fewer the number
of permissible choices, the more narrow the discretion; the
greater the number, the wider the discretion.
This definition of discretion suggests a distinction between
what might be called de jure discretion and de facto discretion:
Immunity from reversal may exist because the choice made was
permissible or because even though the choice was
impermissible, reversal would be improper. An example of the
former is the proper exercise of discretion in response to a
request for a continuance. An example of latter is an application
of the harmless error doctrine. Our concern is with de jure
discretion.
III. WHY MUST THE TRIAL COURT BE GIVEN DISCRETION?

Discretion is indispensable, first, because rules for every
contingency cannot, and should not, be formulated. It is also
indispensible because the trial court is better able to fashion the
appropriate response to a specific fact situation than is an
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appellate court acting either before (by having fashioned a
general rule in prior cases raising a similar issue) or after (by
fashioning a general rule in the course of its present review) the
trial court's exercise of its discretion.2 And finally, discretion is
indispensible because it contributes substantially to a proper
division of labor between trial courts and appellate courts.
IV. SOME TYPES OF ISSUES BEST LEFT
To TRIAL-COURT DISCRETION

Issues that pertain to the details of the management of a
trial are one example of those best left to the discretion of the
trial court, and might include motions to sever; whether to
permit use of expert testimony; management of voir dire; and
time of proof of conspiracy where a co-conspirator statement is
offered as an admission under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Issues that pertain to the credibility of
witnesses are another example, and might include findings of
fact and motions to reopen for new evidence. Issues that
strongly resist efforts to standardize a response are a third
example, and might include dismissal of a juror; declaration of a
mistrial; and use of, or refusal to use, special interrogatories.
Yet another example might be issues that arise
infrequently, such as reopening a case after close of a criminal
trial and setting aside judgment following a bench trial and
ordering a new trial by the judge who conducted the trial. Also
included would be issues the resolution of which requires
assessment of the general fairness of trial, which might include
determination of the effectiveness of counsel in a trial at which
the trial judge presided and denial of motion for mistrial because
of alleged juror misconduct.
Issues that do not affect fundamental rights are an
additional example of those best left to trial-court discretion.
These can best be understood by comparing an issue such as
forum non conveniens with any one of the following issues:
2. This is particularly true where proper decision requires someone who was there, as
Professor Rosenberg has put it, see Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial

Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971), or someone with a "feel
of the case," as Judge Friendly has put it, see Noonan v. CunardSS. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71

(2d Cir. 1967) (quoting Cone v. W Va. Pulp & PaperCo., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947)).
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whether a Denno-type hearing3 should be held on the
trustworthiness of eyewitness identifications; 4 whether to grant
or deny a motion to reveal the identity of a confidential
informer; and whether a stop is based on founded suspicion.
V. SOME TYPES OF ISSUES WITH RESPECT To WHICH
TRIAL-COURT DISCRETION SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED
Issues that pertain to determining the scope and nature of
constitutional rights and duties are one example of those that fall
into this category, which might include whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been
violated and whether a search or seizure conforms to the Fourth
Amendment. Similarly, issues that pertain to interpretation of
statutes and judicial precedents, such as whether there has been
a deprivation of property without due process for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are in this
category as well. Finally, issues that pertain to fashioning a rule
intended to apply to all substantially similar cases in the
future-such as when counsel should be disqualified or when a
class should be decertified-are a third example of those with
respect to which the appellate court need not defer to the
discretion of the trial court.
VI. PITFALLS FOR TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS MANAGING
THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR
Trial courts sometimes regard the protection of
fundamental rights as discretionary. They might, for example, be
unduly sensitive to the cumulative weight of numerous decisions
pertaining to discretionary matters adverse to a defendant in a
criminal case that imperils the fairness of the trial.
Appellate courts sometimes impose a general rule in an
area best left to trial court discretion, at least in large part. They
might, for example, establish rigid rules to govern dismissals for
failure to prosecute or fix precise rules to be followed in
computing allowable attorneys' fees.
3. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
4. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
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Trial courts might leave no record of reasons for exercising
discretion as they did. This might occur in cases that involve, for
example, rulings pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 609(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence or dismissals for failure to prosecute.
Appellate courts sometimes reverse trial courts in areas in
which their discretion has been recognized without either (1) a
finding that the discretion has been abused, or (2) the
establishment of a general rule. Instead the appellate court
merely finds that the trial court was wrong.
Trial courts might exercise their discretion in an apparently
injudicious manner. This creates an atmosphere of arbitrariness
that invites appellate court intervention even when discretion
was, in fact, exercised properly.
Appellate courts might narrow the permissible limits of
discretion for all judges when reviewing and reversing the
actions of the occasional "bad" trial judge.
Trial courts might permit their discretion to be exercised
consistently in a manner that favors the side that the court thinks
should win. This pattern invites reversal even though no
individual exercise is demonstrably an abuse of discretion.
Appellate courts might reduce the scope of discretion,
frequently inadvertently, by so emphasizing the particulars of
the situation in which the trial court exercised its discretion as to
suggest that hereafter only the presence of those circumstances
will justify action such as that being reviewed. In this manner
discretion, in an area in which it is legitimate, is eliminated and
a general rule replaces it.
Trial courts might fail to analyze as carefully as
circumstances require when aware that their resolution of issues
is subject to their own discretion.
Appellate courts might affirm judgments made by trial
courts without adequate review when issues on appeal turn on
whether the trial court exercised its discretion properly.
Trial courts might manipulate the application of general
rules of law by expanding the category of facts to embrace
mixed law and fact issues in which there is more law than fact.
In a similar way, appellate courts might (1) review findings of
5. See Mack v. Smith, 659 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 198 1); Matter ofBankers Trust, 658 F.2d
103. 110-11 (3d Cir. 1981).
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mixed law and fact with the same deference properly accorded
findings of historical facts and (2) clothe trial courts with
considerable discretion in applying a rule of law by treating its
application and the determination of historical facts as merely
findings of fact. Failings of this type might include a trial court's
finding of probable cause to search and exigent circumstances
justifying a search without a warrant as a fact and the appellate
court's deferring to that finding as it would to a finding of
historical fact.

VII. LESSONS

THAT THESE PITFALLS TEACH

Preservation of the proper division of labor between trial
and appellate courts requires careful consideration by both of the
situations in which discretion is exercised, and also requires
mutual respect and deference. What constitutes a proper division
changes over time in response to, inter alia:
* An expansion of fundamental rights, such as
comment on the failure of the defendant in a
criminal case to take the stand.6
* Voir dire examination in cases in which the crime
victim's racial or ethnic group differs from the
defendant's.
* A decision by the appellate courts that equal justice
8
requires a uniform response to a given situation.
* The cumulative force of repeated reviews by
appellate courts of a particular type of exercise of
discretion by trial courts. This situation can be

6. Grifin v. Cal., 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that, although comment by the court
was previously discretionary, it was now prohibited).
7. Rosales-Lopez v. U.S., 451 U.S. 182, 191 (1981) (holding that discretion was not
eliminated, but significantly restricted).
8. U.S. v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (appearing to impose a
virtual requirement that ruling on admissibility of prior convictions be made before
defendant takes stand).
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VIII. SCOPE OF DISCRETION
Trial court discretion may be wide, narrow, or somewhere
in between. The characteristics of issues particularly suitable to
being subject to trial-court discretion and those suitable for
resolution by appellate courts, as well as the pitfalls into which
both types of courts sometimes fall, make clear that the number
of choices available to a trial court will not be the same with
respect to all issues. A spectrum, reflecting a large number of
choices which will enjoy immunity at one end, and a very small
number (sometimes only one) at the other, can be discerned. 9
Several appellate courts' formulations of the standard of
review for the exercise of discretion by trial courts implicitly
recognize that the scope of trial court discretion varies from
issue to issue. This definition, for example, recognizes broad
discretion:
Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action
is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way
of saying that discretion is abused only where no
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial
court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of
the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that
the trial court abused its discretion.' 0
This definition recognizes less broaddiscretion:
"Abuse of discretion" is a phrase which sounds worse than
it really is. All it need mean is that, when judicial action is
taken in a discretionary matter, such action cannot be set
aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and firm
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of
the relevant factors. 1 '

9. This spectrum is reflected in the materials collected in Appendix B, infra pp. 21529.
10. Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
11. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954).
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And this definition recognizes only narrow discretion:
We do not much like the term "abuse" in this context. It has
pejorative connotations not here appropriate. But it has
become the customary word. Perhaps "misuse" is milder.
What we mean, when we say that a court abused its
discretion, is merely that we think that it made a mistake.
There are, however, cases in which the term abuse is
appropriate.12
IX. CONCLUSION

Responses by trial and appellate courts to the existence of
trial-court discretion are quite unsystematic and reflect no
predictable methodology. The fundamental issue, to the solution
of which the existence of trial-court discretion contributes, is the
proper division of labor between the trial and appellate courts:
Trial courts must recognize that their discretion has limits and
appellate courts must recognize that trial-court discretion serves
useful purposes and should be respected.

12. Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1965).
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APPENDIX A
Table 1
Types of Trial-Court Discretion Reviewed
Volumes 658 and 659 of the Federal Reporter, Second Series
Type of Discretion*

,Exercise

xrie
Approved

Exercise
Eecs
Disapproved

xx

x

Denial of motion for evidentiary hearing, 25, 571,
(23)
Sentencing of criminal defendant, 33, 411, (17, 39,
535, 547)

Granting of permanent injunction, 47, 1098, (723)
Refusal to permit objections to special questions out
ofjury's hearing, 54
Refusal to admit evidence of post-accident warning,
54
Appoint civil plaintiff s counsel to prosecute
criminal action, 60
Order denying issuance of preliminary injunction,
76, 359
Denial of motion to vacate conviction because of
ineffective assistance of counsel, 80
Motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, 90, 598, 759
Denial of prejudgment interest and award of post
judgment interest, 103, 399
Denial of motion to vacate sentence, 130

Grant of defendant's motion to disclose identity of
confidential informant, 194
Criminal contempt citation, 211
Denial of motion to sever, 203, 337, 624, (624, 1306)
Finding of fact, 239, (285, 695)
Reduction in attorney fee award, 246
Failure to use expert testimony, 260
Denial of request for renewed voir dire of jurors, 279

X

x

x
xxxx

*Numbers without parenthesis indicate page numbers in Volume 658, while numbers in
parentheses indicate page numbers in Volume 659.

x
xxx
x
x
x
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Table 1 (continued)
Type of Discretion*

SExercise

xrie

Approved

Permission to raise statute of limitation defense, 298

x

Denial of request for jury trial, 300, 1362

x

Admission of evidence, 317, (70, 569)

Refusal to allow impeachment of witness, 352
Ruling that no juror misconduct had occurred, 369
Adequacy of form of special interrogatories to jury,
377
Refusal to grant continuance, 386, (562)
Refusal to grant motion to discharge counsel, 386
Replacement of juror with alternate, 411
Denial of request for injunctive relief, 416
Refusal to admit testimony, 317, 416
Gag order on intra-class communications, 430
Denial of request for attorney fees, 437, 1021, (77,
86)
Denial of motion to suppress testimony, 455
Award of attorney fees, 479, 613, 1137, 1088, (531,

Exercise
Eecs
Disapproved
x

xxx

x
x

xx
x
x
x
xx
x

x

736)xxxx
Failure to excuse a juror for cause, 494, (562)
Refusal to grant further discovery in summonsenforcement proceeding, 526
Reiteration of original findings after appellate
remand for new findings, 544
Denial of FRCP 60 motion, 522
Denial of award of liquidated damages and of
apportionment of liquidated damages, 562
Award of liquidated damages, 1088, 1217, 369
Admission of pretrial and in-court identification, 588
Denial of motion to vacate sentence, 598
Denial of request for lesser-included offence
instruction, 644

xx
x

x
x

xxx
x
x

x
*Numbers without parenthesis indicate page numbers in Volume 658, while numbers in
parentheses indicate page numbers in Volume 659.
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Table 1 (continued)
Type of Discretion*Exrie

Finding of competence to stand trial, 598
Dismissal ofjuror, 654
Award for cost of storage, 697
Grant of preliminary injunction, 797, (150, 273)
Declaration of mistrial, 835

Exercise
Approved
x
x
x
x

Exercise
xrcs
Disapproved

xx

x

District court decision in case inappropriately
removed from state court, 874

Juror-misconduct allegation, 1010, 1225

xx

Refusal to permit criminal defendant to represent
self,

1015

Denial of class certification, 1065, (46, 554)
Denial of motion to suppress on basis of relevance,
prejudice, 1120
Awards of treble damages, 1137
Postponement of claim payment in bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding, 1149
Denial of motion to recuse, 1176
Granting of JNOV, 1256
Refusal to grant JNOV, (306)
Denial of motion to present special interrogatories to
jury, 1319
Admission of items into evidence, application of
FRE 401, 1337
Order disqualifying counsel, 1335, (1259, 1341)
Admission of co-conspirators' statements, (15, 1301)
Finding of voluntariness of confession, (118, 769)
Grant of subpoena of documents, (154, 1376)
Permitting amendment of an indictment, (163)
Denial of motion to intervene, (203)
Failure to impose sanctions for non-compliance with
discovery, (234)

xx

x

x

x
x
x

xx
xx
xx
x
x
x

*Numbers without parenthesis indicate page numbers in Volume 658, while numbers in
parentheses indicate page numbers in Volume 659.

x

x
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Table 1 (continued)
Type of Discretion*Exrie
Dismissal of suit for failure to join party, (234)
Denial of motion for a new criminal trial, (254)
Admission of arrest record, (306, 960)
Scope of injunction, (306)
Failure to instruct, (524)
Motion to reduce sentence, (549)
Denial of motion to compel government to disclose
witness names, (549)
Dismissal of suit for lack of prosecution, (554)
Admission of evidence of witness's plea bargain,
(562)
Court's interrogation of withess to clarify a point,

Exercise
Approved
x
x
x
x
x

Exercise
xrcs
Disapproved
x
x

x

x

(562)

Court's interruption of counsel during closing
arguments, (562)
Denial of F.R. Crim. P. 48(a) motion to dismiss,
(624)

Dismissal for refusal to comply with discovery
orders, (655)
Failure to conduct individual voir dire of jurors,
(684)
Refusal to admit evidence-Rule 803(8), (721)

Admission of expert testimony, (569, 750)
Refusal to admit evidence, (730, 769, 1376)
Refusal to make grand jury files available to state
attorney general, (800)
Back-pay award, (736)

Award of damages under FTCA, (863)
Dismissal for failure to state a claim, (875)
Abstention, (880)
Refusal to admit testimony against penal interest,
(884)

x

x
xxx

x

x

x
x
x

*Numbers without parenthesis indicate page numbers in Volume 658, while numbers in
parentheses indicate page numbers in Volume 659.
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Table 1 (continued)
Type of Discretion*

Exercise
Approved

Admission of former testimony, (884)

x

Conditioning a stay pending appeal on a waiver, (932)
Award to attorneys in bankruptcy appeal on a waiver,
(951)
Certification of a sub-class, (1000)
Dismissal of suit for failure to comply with order
requiring joinder of party, (1168)
Failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying

x
x
x

class certification, (1259)

Admission of evidence, Rule 803(6), (1314)
Denial of motion for relief of final judgment, (1320)

x
x

Approved of settlement in antitrust case, (1322, 1337)

xx

Refusal to compel government to present exculpatory
evidence to grand jury, (1376)
*Numbers without parenthesis indicat pa
indicate page numbers in Volume 659.

Exercise
Disapproved

x
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Table 2
Statistical Data, Volumes 658 and 659
Federal Reporter, Second Series
Total number of cases
.427
Total number of cases where abuse of discretion appears to have been used
as part of the standard of review
Percentage of cases appearing to have used abuse-of-discretion standard
Number of issues for which discretion appears to have been exercised
Percentage of total issues where exercise was approved
Percentage of total issues where exercise was disapproved

123
28.8%
149
71.8%
28.2%

Table 3
Statistical Data for Volume 658 Only
Percentage of cases in which standard of review is explicitly stated to be
abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious, or the reviewing court
states that the lower court had "discretion" to arrive at its decision
Percentage of cases in which the standard is applied sub silentio
Where abuse of discretion or similar standard is stated
Exercise approved
Exercise disapproved
Where standard is applied sub silentio
Exercise approved
Exercise disapproved

59.1%

40.9%
69.2%
30.8%
61.3%
33.5%

EXERCISE AND REVIEW OF TRIAL-COURT DISCRETION

APPENDIX B
I. SOME AREAS OF TRIAL COURT DISCRETION OUTLINED
A. De Jure Discretion

1. Wide Discretion to:
* Acquit.
Authority: Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54 (1978);
U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564
(1977); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
Limits on Exercise:
Must represent a resolution of facts in
defendant's favor. U.S. v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 97 (1978).
*

Sentence.
Authority: Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 60405 (1978); Dorszynski v. U.S., 418 U.S. 424, 431
(1974).
Limits on Exercise:
Includes discretion to consider defendant's
refusal to cooperate with officials
investigating criminal conspiracy in which
he was a confessed participant as factor in
imposing sentence. Roberts v. U.S., 445

U.S. 552 (1980).
Statutory limits. Id.

215
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"Plain showing of abuse." U.S. v. Santiago,
582 F.2d 1128, 1137 (7th Cir. 1978).
Use of untrue or "improper" facts.
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)
(untrue facts); U.S. v. Stoddard, 553 F.2d

1385, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (improper
facts).
* Grant a Continuance.
Authority: U.S. v. Tissi, 601 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.
1979); U.S. v. Albert, 595 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1979); Abramson v. U. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202
(9th Cir. 1979).
Limits on Exercise:

Clear abuse; trial court may not preclude
"a just determination of the cause." U.S. v.
Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1978); see also U.S. v. West, 607 F.2d 300

(9th Cir. 1979).
* Allow or Deny Cross-Examination.
Authority: Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318
(1974); Brookhartv. Janis,384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966);
U.S. v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1979).

Limits on Exercise:
Did the jury have sufficient information?
Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318; U.S. v. Leja, 568
F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Palmer,
536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976).
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* Reopen Trial for Additional Evidence.
Authority: U.S. v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261 (9th
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Larson, 596 F.2d 759 (8th
Cir. 1979).
Limits on Exercise:
Ramirez, 608 F.3d 1261; U.S. v. Marino,

562 F.2d 941(5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v.
Sisack, 527 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1975).
*

Determine Scope of Voir Dire.
Authority: U.S. v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1976).
Limits on Exercise:
Sound judicial discretion. U.S. v.
Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1981);
Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295; U.S. v. Gibbons,

602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1979); US. v.
Clabaugh, 589 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1979);
US. v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1976).
Voir dire on racial or ethnic bias must be
conducted when requested by defendant
accused of violent crime against victim
who is member of different ethnic group.
Rosales-Lopez v. US., 451 U.S. 182, 192

(1981).
* Grant Discovery in Civil Cases.
Authority: Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947); see Dept. of Energy v. Brett, 659 F.2d
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154 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981); Abraham E.
Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of
Justice, 22 Temp. L.Q. 174 (1948).
Limits on Exercise:
Discovery materials must be relevant to
issues in case; qualified immunity for
attorneys' work product. Hickman, 329
U.S. 495; Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-56 (1978).
*

Establish Local Rules Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

83.
Authority: Martinez v. Thrifty Drug & Discount
Co., 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1979).
Limits on Exercise:
Rules must be adopted by majority of
judges and must not conflict with other
rules of civil procedure, must be consistent
with constitutional due process, and must
not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Bernard v. Gulf 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.
1979); Lee v. Dallas Co. Bd. of Educ., 578
F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1978).
*

Grant Discovery Sanctions.
Authority: Natl. Hockey League v. Metro.
Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (holding that
sanctions must be available to court for purposes
of deterrence); U.S. ex rel. U.S. Naval Ship Pvt.
Joseph F. Merrell v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire
Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Limits on Exercise:
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (no
imprisonment or other contempt penalty
for refusal to submit to physical or mental
examination, but dismissal discretionary).
*

Grant Permission to Amend Pleadings.
Authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (court
encouraged to look favorably on requests to
amend); Shows v. Harber, 575 F.2d 1253 (8th
Cir. 1978); Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379
U.S. 148 (1964).
Limits on Exercise:
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
("[O]utright refusal to grant the leave
without any justifying reason. . . is . . .
abuse . . . of.

*

Grant Permission
Deadline.

.

. discretion").

to

Implead

After

Ten-Day

Authority: Laffey v. N. W. Airlines, 567 F.2d 429
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila.
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 439 n. 6 (3d
Cir. 1971) (indicating that duplication and
circuity justify denial of motion).
*

Recuse.
Authority: 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) (directed to
judge, self-enforcing); Davis v. Bd. of Sch.
Commns., 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Limits on Exercise:
U.S. v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 536 (3d
Cir. 1979) (no per se rule exists).

* Determine Competency of Witnesses.
Authority: Crawford v. Worth, 447 F.2d 738

(5th Cir. 1971).
Limits on Exercise:
Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake, 144

U.S. 476, 484 (1892) ("clearly erroneous"
standard is applicable).
* Use General Verdict Forms.
Authority: Cancellierv. FederatedDept. Stores,

672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982).
* Certify Class In Class Action
Authority: Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600,

605 (7th Cir. 1980).
Limits on Exercise:
May be exercised to certify a nationwide
class. Calfano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,

701-03 (1979). Scope of injunctive relief
is dictated by the extent of the violation
established, not by geographical limit.
* Deny or Award Costs.
Authority: District judge has discretion to deny
prevailing party costs under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d). Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346,

EXERCISE AND REVIEW OF TRIAL-COURT DISCRETION

221

353-55 (1981) (noting that Rule 68 does not
affect this discretion.).
*

Findings

Review
Suppression-Hearing
Magistrate.

Authority:

28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B),

(C)

(granting district courts broad discretion to
accept, reject, or modify the magistrate's
proposed finding, including the hearing of live
witnesses to resolve conflicting credibility
claims); U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680
(1980).
*

Impose Contempt Charges and Penalties.
Authority: Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild, Local
35 v. Wash. Post Co., 626 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
1980); U.S. v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.

1980).
Limits on Exercise:
"[L]east coercive sanction .

. .

reasonably

calculated to win compliance" with court
order. U.S. v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 527
(9th Cir. 1980).
2. Less Wide Discretion to:
* Find facts.
Authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); U.S. v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).

Limits on Exercise:
Must not be clearly erroneous (i.e.,
appellate court must not be left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake

of
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has been made), must not be based on
erroneous conception of local law, and
must be a finding of fact and not a
conclusion of law. Marshal v. Kirkland,
602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1979).
*

Grant Motion for New Trial for Improper Conduct
of Judge, Attorney, Witness, or Juror.
Authority: Lutz v. Commr., 593 F.2d 45 (6th Cir.
1979) (impropriety must deprive litigant of a fair
trial); County of Maricopa v. Maberry, 555 F.2d
207 (9th Cir. 1977).
Limits on Exercise:
U.S. v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir.
1981); Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1978).

*

Grant Motion for New Trial Because of Inadequate
or Excessive Damages.
Authority: Schultz v. Lamb, 591 F.2d 1268 (9th
Cir. 1978); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1978); Ajax HardwareMfg. Corp. v. Indus.
Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1977);
Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.
1977).
Limits on Exercise:
Varies with setting of the issue. Where
issue is failure to provide damages for a
compensable injury, a question of law.
Where issue is consistency with the
evidence, a question of fact, or one of
mixed law and fact. Where issue concerns
"pain and suffering" or punitive damages,
discretion is wide.
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Fully reviewable where issue of law;
reviewable where clearly erroneous where
issue of fact or mixed law and fact; and
reviewable only where "conscience is
shocked" in other instances.
*

Admit Prior Convictions to Impeach Credibility.
Authority: Fed. R. Evid. 609; scope differs as to

defendant and other witnesses, type of crime for
which convicted, lapse of time since conviction,
and probative value of prior conviction. U.S. v.
Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc);
U.S. v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1980).
Limits on Exercise:
Fairly narrow, particularly with respect to
defendant. Probative value in such case
must be shown to be strong to overcome
prejudice. U.S. v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757 (9th
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
*

Admit Character Evidence and Evidence of Other
Crimes.
Authority: Fed. R. Evid. 404 limits admissibility
to specific purposes. U.S. v. Mohel, 604 F.2d
748 (2d Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Hernandez-Miranda,
601 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
Limits on Exercise:
Fairly narrow grounds for admission but if
related sufficiently to those ends discretion
reasonably broad. U.S. v. Calhoun, 604

224

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Phillips,
599 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979).
*

Consolidate Cases.
Authority: Am. Employers' Ins. Co. v. King
Resources Co., 545 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1976).
Limits on Exercise:
Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.
1973) (prejudice to party).

*

Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.
Authority: Schmidt v. Herrman, 614 F.2d 1221
(9th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542
F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure to
prosecute to be considered in exercising
discretion).

*

Admit Expert Testimony.
Authority: U.S. v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344 (9th
Cir. 1981); Reno-West Coast Distrib. Co. v.
Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1979).
Limits on Exercise:
Expert must rely on established or accepted
technology. U.S. v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d
750 (7th Cir. 1981).

3. Narrow Discretion to:
*

Hold Persons in Summary Criminal Contempt.
Authority: 18 U.S.C. § 401; U.S. v. Wilson, 421
U.S. 309, 319 (1975). See Richard B. Kuhns,
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The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and
a New Perspective, 88 Yale L.J. 39, 90-91
(1978); Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a).
Limits on Exercise:
Conduct must be contumacious and take
place in presence of the court. Arguably,
conduct must be an open, serious threat to
orderly procedure. In re Gustafson, 650
F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981) (limited en
banc).
*

Grant Motions for Directed Verdict or Judgment
N.O.V.
Authority: Proper when evidence against the
verdict is overwhelming after viewing it in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Farnerv. Paccar,Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.
1977) (non-moving party when motion for
directed verdict involved).
Limits on Exercise:
Trial court may not assess credibility of
witnesses. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir.
1976).

*

Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction on Abstention
Grounds.
Authority: Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v.
City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 839 (9th Cir.
1979).
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Limits on Exercise:
R.R. Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315 (1943); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977).
*

Certify to State Court.
Authority: Clay v. Sun Ins. Off Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960); Lee v. Frozen Food Express, Inc.,
592 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1979).
Limit of Discretion:
See "Decline to exercise jurisdiction on
abstention grounds," supra pp. 225-26.

*

Grant Attorney Fees.
Limits on Exercise:
District court may not award fees premised
on acts or omissions for which appellants
enjoy absolute legislative immunity. S. Ct.
of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719,
737-39 (1980).
District court may award attorney fees to
defendant in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 only if court finds that plaintiffs
action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation." Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam).
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Appoint Counsel in In Forma Pauperis Action.
Limits on Exercise:
District court may not deny counsel when
doing so would result in fundamental
unfairness impinging on due process rights.
Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431
(7th Cir. 1978); cf Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1978) (district
court should appoint counsel if pro se
litigant has colorable claim and lacks
capacity to present it); Shields v. Jackson,
570 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (remand
to district court to appoint counsel
appropriate where indigent prisoner is in
no position to investigate his case, prisoner
states a cause of action, and appointment of
counsel will advance the administration of
justice); see also Hyman v. Rickman, 446
U.S. 989 (1980) (dissent from denial of
certiorari).

*

Enter Final Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Limits on Exercise:
Must be exercised "in the interest of sound
judicial administration." Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1,10
(1980).
of
exercise
unreasonable"
"Clearly
discretion required to justify disturbing
trial court's assessment of the equities. Id.
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B. De Facto Discretion
*

Harmless Constitutional Error.
Authority: Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
(standard for immunity from reversal).
Limits on Exercise:
Error must be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at
24.
Application of Chapman standard may
focus upon whether
the error contributed to the guilty
verdict,
there remains enough to support the
verdict if the evidence flowing from the
error is excluded,
the constitutionally tainted evidence
was merely cumulative.
See Martha A. Field, Assessing the
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional
Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976).

* Final Judgment Rule.
Authority: 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides
jurisdiction to hear appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts. An improper
exercise by a district court of its discretion prior
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to final decision may become immune from
review either because final judgment favored the
disadvantaged party, or the issue became greatly
reduced in importance in view of final decision,
or a settlement prior to final judgment rendered
the issue moot. Thus, there is a fairly large area
for maneuver by trial court and attorneys.
Limits on Exercise:
Jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals

exists in various situations. See 28 U.S.C. §
1292; 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the "all writs"
statute); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) authorizes final
judgment on "fewer than all the claims or
parties" under specific circumstances.
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